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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JERIME ANDERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040120-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of 
conspiracy to commit murder, a second degree felony (R. 180-81). 
This court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court plainly err in submitting the case 
to the jury or did defense counsel render ineffective assistance 
of counsel for not filing a motion for directed verdict, where 
the evidence and its reasonable inferences, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict, sufficed to establish that 
defendant conspired with Jared Mendoza to kill Timothy Lords? 
2. Was defense counsel ineffective for failing to object to 
evidence of defendant's prior drug use and incarceration, and did 
the trial court plainly err by admitting it, where most of the 
evidence was necessary to explain the circumstances leading to 
the death of Timothy Lords and the remaining evidence did not 
prejudice the outcome of the case? 
To prevail on a claim of plain error, defendant must 
demonstrate that the trial court erred, that the error should 
have been obvious, and that, absent the error, he had a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). In reviewing a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must determine 
whether trial counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, 
whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. 
Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991). This claim presents 
a question of law, reviewed on the record of the underlying 
trial. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 11 16-11, 12 P.3d 
92. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (West 2004), governing conspiracy, 
provides: 
For purposes of this part a person is guilty 
of conspiracy when he, intending that conduct 
constituting a crime be performed, agrees 
with one or more persons to engage in or 
cause the performance of the conduct and any 
one of them commits an overt act in pursuance 
of the conspiracy, except where the offense 
is a capital felony, a felony against the 
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person, arson, burglary, or robbery, the 
overt act is not required for the commission 
of conspiracy. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with murder, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2004) and conspiracy 
to commit murder, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-4-201 and 76-5-203 (West 2004). A jury acquitted 
him of murder but convicted him of conspiracy to commit murder 
(R. 127). The trial court sentenced defendant to one-to-fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison, consecutive to a sentence he was 
already serving in Idaho (R. 168-69). Defendant filed this 
timely appeal (R. 170) . The court later amended the judgment to 
include restitution of $5025 (R. 180-81). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 27, 2002, police found the body of a 19-year-
old man on an access road just off the Portage exit of 1-15 near 
the Idaho border (R. 185: 88, 96). The investigating officer 
observed that the man, Timothy Lords, had "massive trauma to the 
back of the head" and two bullet holes in his shirt (Id. at 90). 
It also appeared to the officer that Lords had been run over (Id. 
at 95). Searching Lords' belongings, the officer found his 
identification, as well as several small bindles that appeared to 
contain traces of either meth or cocaine (Id.). 
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Defendant was eventually brought to trial on charges of both 
murder and conspiracy to commit murder (R. 64-65). Jared 
Mendoza, incarcerated for the murder, testified at length about 
the events leading up to the September 27th shooting.1 Mendoza 
testified that he and Mendoza planned to kill Lords after police 
arrested a drug dealer named Jody Carpenter in Pocatello, Idaho 
(Id. at 121-23). Mendoza went to defendant's apartment to tell 
him about the arrest, since both of them knew Carpenter (Id.). 
Defendant surmised that Timothy Lords had "snitched [Jody] off 
. . . and that's why she went down" (Id. at 123). 
Mendoza testified that defendant "said that we should take 
care of [Lords]," meaning "kill him" (Id.). At the time, Mendoza 
owed Jody Carpenter $2800 for drugs (Id. at 124). After Jody 
Carpenter's arrest, defendant took over her drug-dealing 
business, including the debt Mendoza owed her (Id. at 129). 
Defendant had bragged to Mendoza about kidnaping the brother of a 
user who owed him money (Id.). Mendoza testified, "He said that 
people — this is what happens to people that can't pay us, pretty 
much" (Id.). Mendoza felt that if he "could be a part of what was 
going on," then Jody and her associates, including defendant, 
would "forget about the money I owed them" (Id. at 124, 127). 
1
 At the time of trial, Mendoza had entered a guilty plea 
to first degree felony murder but had not yet been sentenced. 
Both the prosecution and defense explored at length the timing of 
Mendoza's testimony as it might relate to his credibility. See 
R. 185: 152-56, 165-69. 
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Accordingly, when defendant asked, Mendoza "told him that I'd 
help him do it. I'd do it for him" (Id. at 123). Defendant 
suggested that Mendoza should kill Lords with a weapon defendant 
would supply, "at a camp" in McCammon, Idaho, on the way to Ogden 
to buy drugs (Id. at 130, 133).2 
On the night of September 27th, defendant and Mendoza took a 
Blazer from Jody Carpenter's house and drove to a residence, 
where defendant had arranged to pick up Timothy Lords (Id. at 
103, 130-31). The threesome then left for Ogden (R. 186: 48-49). 
Lords, sitting in the front passenger seat, and Mendoza, sitting 
behind him in the back seat, began fooling with guns, shooting 
out the window at road signs (R. 185: 133; R. 186: 53).3 Mendoza 
testified that when they reached McCammon, they stopped for gas 
but "I pretend like I'm sleeping so that I don't have to do it. 
I try to slack it off, Timothy [Lord]'s death[,] I try to slack 
it off. I chicken it out, I guess" (R. 185: 133). The group 
continued on to Ogden, where Mendoza returned defendant's gun to 
2
 According to Mendoza, a woman named Taunya Toler was also 
present during this conversation (R. 185: 131). Toler was 
brought from an Idaho correctional center to testify at the 
preliminary hearing (R. 186: 22). At the time of trial, she was 
on probation and subject to a subpoena, but failed to appear (Id. 
at 20). Because the court determined she was legally 
unavailable, her preliminary hearing testimony was read to the 
jury (Id. at 22). Toler testified that Mendoza came to her house 
with defendant and said they were going to take Lords to Utah "to 
do some things to him" or "to take care of him" (Id. at 23-24). 
3
 According to defendant, Lords always carried a gun in his 
waistband (R. 186: 63). 
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him, receiving a "a dirty look" in return (Id. at 134). 
Defendant then left Mendoza and Lords at a friend's house and 
completed the drug deal at another location (Id. at 133). 
Defendant returned with the drugs (Id. at 134). Mendoza 
testified that he and defendant went into the bathroom: 
Him and I get high. He tells me what is 
going on, Mendoza, are you bitching out on 
me. I said I'll do it, I'll do it, don't 
worry about it. He said if you don't do it 
I'll kill you. That's when he gave me back 
the weapon. 
Id. He added, "He just said he would kill me. He didn't have 
to. I knew it was pretty much over the money I owed" (Id. at 
135). Mendoza suggested they could stop at the Portage exit, an 
area with which he was familiar (Id.). 
Defendant pulled off the highway at Portage. Mendoza 
I was going to take care of it outside of the 
vehicle. I don't know. I chickened out. 
[Defendant] and [Lords] get out of the car. 
They take a leak. [Defendant] gets back in 
the vehicle and gives me a dirty look. . . . 
[Lords] come up to my door. He come up to my 
door and asked if I wanted to sit up front. 
I told him no. He got back in the vehicle. 
[Defendant] gave me another look. We started 
pulling out and I get scared. And it took 
everything I had to fire that first shot. 
Id. at 135-36. Mendoza fired the first shot through the back of 
the front passenger seat (Id. at 137). He testified: 
There's a time gap. I'm not sure how much 
time. It seemed like forever, but I can't 
tell you how long it was. [Lords] said, ow, 
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ow, I've been shot. [Defendant] looks over to 
see and [Lords] is pulling something out. I 
go to see what he's looking at and I see 
[Lords] pulling his gun out. That's when I 
shot again, the second shot. 
Id. at 137. 
At this juncture, Mendoza's attention was drawn to 
defendant, who jumped out of the vehicle. When Mendoza looked 
back, he saw Lords' gun (Id.). Mendoza said, "And I ducked down 
because I thought he was going to shoot me. I ducked down and 
shot him in the back of the head" (Id.). 
Mendoza got out of the vehicle, opened the front door, 
secured Lords' gun, and pulled Lords out of the vehicle (Id. at 
138). He ran around to the driver's side, got in, and drove off 
in search of defendant. He stated that as he pulled away, "at 
first I thought I'd hit a post. The vehicle went up — I never 
had hit a curb or anything before. I don't know" (Id. at 139). 
Mendoza drove towards the entrance to the highway but was 
reluctant to go without defendant. Mendoza exited the car once 
more and yelled for defendant, who came running down a hill and 
got into the car (Id.). Mendoza asked defendant if they should 
"take some back roads" home (Id. at 140). Defendant told him no, 
to stay on the highway and to drive the speed limit (Id.). The 
two then drove to defendant's apartment in Pocatello (Id. at 
140) . 
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In a later conversation, defendant told Mendoza, 'n[W]e need 
to get rid of these [guns]'" (Id. at 141). Mendoza testified 
that he eventually disposed of one gun in a pond and the other in 
the mountains (Id^ at 142-43).4 
According to Mendoza, he and defendant also discussed what 
they should do with Jody Carpenter's Blazer, which they had taken 
for the trip to Ogden by using a hide-a-key whose location 
Mendoza knew (Id. at 104, 144-45). Mendoza testified: 
[Defendant] told me that Jody had called the 
Blazer in as stolen and that I better hurry 
up and do something with it. He reminded me 
of the money I owed him. I kind of got mad 
at him at the time because I was doing all 
this stuff for him and he still — I still 
wasn't being — he was treating me the same 
way. I got mad and torched the Blazer. 
Id. at 145.5 
Mendoza admitted that he and defendant also discussed what 
they would say if they got caught (Id. at 148). Mendoza would 
take the blame for the killing, and defendant would maintain that 
the first shot was accidental (Id.). When Mendoza was, in fact, 
caught, he told the police a variety of stories, ranging from 
wholesale denial to maintaining the killing was accidental to 
conceding it was intentional, and from blaming defendant to 
4
 The police never found either gun (R. 186: 17, 33-34). 
5
 Mendoza put several gallons of gasoline in the vehicle, 
lit something with a cigarette lighter, and then dropped the 
burning object in the vehicle (R. 185: 146) . 
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confessing that he shot Lords himself (Id. at 149-51/ 153-54). 
In conclusion, Mendoza conceded he was not happy testifying 
"[because] the reason we killed [Lords] is because he was a 
snitch and now I'm doing the same thing" (Id. at 166). 
Defendant, like Mendoza, also told the police a variety of 
conflicting stories about the events of September 27th (Id. at 
105-07, 113-14). His testimony came in both through the police 
detective who interviewed him after his arrest and then, during 
the defense case, through a stipulated excerpted videotape of the 
interview. ,See R. 185: 102-119; R. 186: 37, 39-104. 
In the videotape, defendant corroborated that "Jared Mendoza 
killed Tim [Lords]" (R. 186: 51). Defendant also corroborated 
that he took Jody Carpenter's Blazer to buy drugs in Ogden; that 
he made the trip with Mendoza and Lords; that he was driving, 
Lords was in the front passenger seat, and Mendoza was behind 
Lords in the back seat; that there were two guns in the car; that 
both Mendoza and Lords were shooting the guns out the window; 
that they stopped at Portage either to relieve themselves or to 
switch seats; that he had just begun driving again when he heard 
first a shot and then Lords exclaim that he had been shot; that 
he jumped out of the car without putting it in park, and that he 
temporarily ran away (Id. at 46-47, 51, 53-54, 56-57, 62, 66, 
94) . 
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Defendant's story, however, differed markedly from Mendoza's 
trial testimony about the shooting itself. In essencer defendant 
maintained that he was afraid of Mendoza, not vice versa, and 
that he had no idea Mendoza was going to shoot Lords. Of the 
shooting, he stated: 
So we're going, we turn around and get back 
on the gravel road and I just hear a gunshot, 
bam. And I look over and . . .[Lords is] 
just going, I've been shot, I've been shot, 
like this. And I was like — I thought 
[Lords] pulled out his gun because I thought 
his gun went off in him, see what I'm saying? 
Because he had that nine in his pants. 
You know, I just thought he shot himself. 
And then I look again and [Mendoza] goes bam 
and shoots again. And I just jumped out of 
the car, the truck, and start running and 
hauling ass. 
Id. at 56-57. Defendant told the detective he ran away because 
he was afraid Mendoza was going to shoot him, too, and that he 
got back into the Blazer only because Mendoza had a gun and told 
him to, thereby leaving him with no other choice. Id. at 57, 62, 
68. 
Defendant maintained that he tried to calm Mendoza down on 
the way back to Pocatello and then get away from him as soon as 
possible: 
Heading towards home, [Mendoza]'s freaking 
out . . . [H]e said, how could you do that to 
me — for running — I thought you had my back, 
homes. . . I was like, man, what do you mean 
I had your back? 
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And then after finally he - everything was 
calm and . . . [he] says, you know, tell you 
the truth, homes, the first shot was an 
accident. I had — and he was pulling out his 
gun or something and he said I had to do it. 
I said you didn't have to do, he wasn't 
pulling out his gun, he thought he shot 
himself. I tried to explain to him, I said, 
you didn't have to do it. And then I just 
cried all the way home, the rest of the way 
home. 
As soon as we got in town he tried going 
somewhere else other than my house, you know 
what I'm saying? . . . And I said, what are 
you doing? I don't know, homes. He just 
kept trying to get me to be with him, you 
know, be with him to help him with the 
with the cleaning it up or whatever. I told 
him, no, man, take me home. He says, what 
should I do? I said, I don't know, man. Take 
me home. 
Id. at 71-73. According to defendant, Mendoza dropped him off at 
home, but then just parked in the driveway. Defendant went back 
outside. He told the detective: 
And I go back out there and I said, what are 
you doing here, dude? I said, get out of 
here, go, I'm done. You know, I promised I 
wouldn't say nothing, you know, I told him I 
wouldn't say nothing to nobody ever. I knew 
I would, though, you know, I had to. Crazy. 
Id. at 73. 
After the jury heard this testimony and the testimony of 
several other police officers, it acquitted defendant of murder 
and convicted him of conspiracy to commit murder. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First, the evidence was sufficient to support a conspiracy 
conviction, thus defeating defendant's claim that the trial court 
plainly erred by not dismissing the case and that defense counsel 
was ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict. 
Defendant's argument ignores the jury's role in determining the 
credibility of the witnesses, and incorrectly presumes that the 
jury had to believe the evidence most favorable to him rather 
than that presented by the State. When the evidence is viewed in 
a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, it was sufficient 
to support the conviction. 
Second, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
object to evidence of defendant's prior involvement with drugs 
and his previous incarceration, and the trial court did not 
plainly err by admitting such evidence. Several of the 
references revealed defendant's motive to have Lords killed and 
his plan to do so by explaining why Jared Mendoza was afraid of 
defendant and, consequently, why he would serve as the 
triggerman. Moreover, defendant has wholly failed to demonstrate 
anything more than a speculative possibility of a more favorable 
outcome in the absence of the remaining testimony to which he 
objects. Given the chilling circumstances of the murder, 
defendant's previous incarceration or his use of drugs around the 
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time of the murder is unlikely to have come as any surprise to 
the jury, much less affected the outcome of their deliberations. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR 
IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY 
AND DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT 
INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE FOR 
A DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE THE 
EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO PROVE THAT 
DEFENDANT CONSPIRED WITH JARED 
MENDOZA TO KILL TIMOTHY LORDS 
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by 
submitting the case to the jury because the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that he either killed Timothy Lords or 
conspired with Jared Mendoza to kill Lords. See Br. of Aplt. at 
21-22. Because defendant did not preserve the issue at trial by 
filing an appropriate motion, he relies on a plain error argument 
on appeal. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 116, 10 P.3d 346 
(generally, in order to preserve issue for appeal, defendant must 
raise sufficiency claim by proper motion). NN[T]o establish plain 
error, a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and 
second that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that 
the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Id. 
at 517. Only after the defendant convincingly makes an initial 
showing of insufficiency will the appellate court "determine 
whether the evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental 
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that it was plain error to submit the case to the jury." Id. at 
118. 
At the outset, defendant's argument is inadequately briefed. 
While defendant cites and discusses several cases reversed for 
insufficient evidence, he wholly fails to apply their teachings 
to the facts of this case. See Br. of Aplt. at 19-21. Moreover, 
his discussion of this case consists of less than a page and 
incorporates no legal analysis at all. Id. at 21-22. "[R]ule 
24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but 
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). 
Absent any meaningful analysis, this Court should decline to 
reach the merits of defendant's claim. See, e.g., State v. 
Thomas, 1999 UT 2, 1 13, 974 P.2d 269; State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 
1, 5 31, 973 P.2d 404; State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 250 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
Moreover, even on the merits, defendant's claim fails 
because he does not recognize the role of credibility in the 
jury's assessment of the evidence. The law is well-settled that 
NX
 [d] eterminations of witness credibility are left to the jury. 
The jury is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of any 
witness's testimony." State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah 
App. 1993)(citing State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 901, 904-05 (Utah App. 
1990). And, 
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[w]hen the evidence presented is conflicting 
or disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive 
judge of both the credibility of witnesses 
and the weight to be given particular 
evidence. Ordinarily, a reviewing court may 
not reassess credibility or reweigh the 
evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the 
evidence in favor of the jury verdict. 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993)(citations 
omitted). 
This case turned largely on credibility. At its crux, the 
jury had to choose between defendant's story, which came in 
through the stipulated excerpted videotape of his interview with 
the police, and the trial testimony of Jared Mendoza.6 Once the 
jury chose to believe Mendoza, the evidence clearly sufficed to 
convict defendant of conspiracy to kill Timothy Lords. Mendoza's 
testimony provided a basis for the jury to reasonably believe 
that defendant, while not actually pulling the trigger, intended 
that Lords be killed and agreed with Mendoza to facilitate the 
killing by planning the circumstances under which it would occur, 
by supplying the gun, by stopping in Portage, and by encouraging 
Mendoza to shoot Lords. No more was necessary to send the case 
to the jury. 
6
 Defendant argues that Mendoza's testimony was 
"unsupported" and, therefore, should not be believed. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 22. Defendant's testimony, of course, was similarly 
"unsupported." Because the only two witnesses to the killing 
described the event differently, the jury plainly had to choose 
between them. 
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Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to move for a directed verdict. See Br. of Aplt. at 12-
17.7 Because a motion for a directed verdict would have been 
futile, defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by 
failing to file the motion. See State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 
295, 1 22, 55 P.3d 1147 (stating that "^failure of counsel to 
make motions or objections which would be futile if raised does 
not constitute ineffective assistance'" (citation omitted)). 
Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance and plain error thus 
both fail. 
POINT TWO 
DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE 
FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO EVIDENCE 
OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR DRUG USE AND 
INCARCERATION, AND THE TRIAL COURT 
DID NOT PLAINLY ERR BY ADMITTING 
SUCH EVIDENCE, WHERE THAT EVIDENCE 
WAS NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE DEATH 
OF TIMOTHY LORDS; IN ANY EVENT, THE 
EVIDENCE DID NOT UNFAIRLY PREJUDICE 
THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE 
7
 This argument is even more inadequately briefed than his 
plain error argument. Defendant devotes more than five pages to 
a sequential listing of ineffective assistance cases but wholly 
fails to analyze what the cases stand for or how their principles 
apply to his case. See, e.g.. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. 
He devotes only a single, four-sentence paragraph to the facts of 
his case. See id. at 17. Under such circumstances, the Court 
should not address his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
for failure to move for a directed verdict. See State v. Garner, 
2002 UT App 234, 1 12. 
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Defendant argues both that his counsel was ineffective and 
that the court committed plain error when the jury was permitted 
to hear evidence of his prior drug usage and incarceration. See 
Br. of Aplt. at 22-29. He seems to assert that the evidence was 
inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) and that, in the 
absence of an objection by defense counsel, the court should have 
sua sponte engaged in an analysis under rules 404(b) and 403, and 
then excluded the evidence. See id. at 25-28. He also contends 
that admission of the evidence was prejudicial because it 
"maligned the defendant's character in the eyes of the jury and 
eroded the presumption of innocence." Id. at 12. 
Specifically, defendant objects to several drug references: 
to testimony about a drug-related kidnaping for which defendant 
apparently took credit; to a reference that defendant took over 
Jody Carpenter's drug business after her arrest; and to testimony 
that defendant had drugs and cash on his person when he was 
arrested (R. 185: 125-26, 129; R. 186: 11). See Br. of Aplt. at 
22-23. 
Defense counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to 
object to this testimony, and the trial court did not plainly err 
by admitting it because the evidence helped explain the motive 
and plan behind the killing. By so doing, the evidence completed 
the story for the jury of the conspiracy to kill Timothy Lords. 
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Defendant's claim is governed by rule 404(b), which includes 
analysis under rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
That is, Min deciding whether evidence of other crimes is 
admissible under rule 404(b), the trial court must determine (1) 
whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter 
purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the 
requirements of rule 402, and (3) whether this evidence meets the 
requirements of rule 403." State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 5120, 
993 P.2d 837. 
Rule 404(b), governing evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts to prove the character of a person, is an "inclusionary" 
rule. State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App. 1993); State 
v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991). That is, evidence 
demonstrating a non-character purpose "is not precluded so long 
as the evidence is offered for a legitimate purpose other than to 
show the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged." 
State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, 1 17, 108 P.3d 730; accord State v. 
Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989) T[r]ule 404(b) does 
not exclude evidence unless it fits an exception; rather, it 
allows admission of relevant evidence ^other than to show merely 
the general disposition of the defendant'"(quotation omitted)). 
Here, the evidence showed both defendant's motive and plan, 
thus completing the story of the conspiracy for the jury. The 
references to defendant taking over Jody Carpenter's drug-dealing 
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business and the drug-related kidnaping for which defendant took 
credit explained to the jury why Mendoza, who was originally in 
debt to Carpenter, feared defendant. That is, Mendoza owed Jody 
Carpenter money, and that debt transferred to defendant when 
defendant took over Carpenter's business. Defendant's 
involvement in the kidnaping of a family member of someone else 
who owed him money instilled in Mendoza a fear that the same 
thing could happen to him if he failed to repay his debt to 
defendant. The evidence thus explained why Mendoza was willing 
to do defendant's bidding and take the lead in killing Lords. 
The testimony of the police officer that defendant had drugs and 
a large amount of cash on his person at the time of his arrest 
corroborated Mendoza's testimony that defendant had taken over 
Carpenter's business and that Mendoza's fear of defendant was 
well-founded. 
Because evidence of defendant's involvement with the drug 
trade was used for the non-character purposes of explaining 
defendant's motive to kill Lords and explaining the plan he and 
Mendoza developed to carry out the conspiracy, it passed the rule 
404(b) threshold. See United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269, 272 
(10th Cir. 1995) (evidence is admissible when it provides context 
for the crime, is necessary to a full presentation of the case, 
or is appropriate in order to complete the story of the crime by 
proving its immediate context or res gestae (quoting United 
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States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir. 1980)); State v. 
Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 n.4 (Utah App. 1991) (holding that 
although rule 404 contains no express exception for "background 
information" showing how the charges came forward, "the 
prosecutor is entitled to paint a factual picture of the context 
in which the events in question transpired;" State v. Pierce, 
722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986) (holding that evidence showing "the 
general circumstances surrounding" the crime should not be 
excluded as "prior crimes" evidence). Although defendant in the 
instant case did not make a rule 404(b) objection, these cases 
implicitly corroborate that such an objection would have been 
futile and that the evidence would nonetheless have been 
admitted. 
Moreover, the evidence was plainly relevant to the jury's 
determination of defendant's culpability under rule 402, 
precisely because it explained both motive to kill and the plan 
underlying the conspiracy. The final analytical hurdle is 
whether the probative value of the evidence "is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403. This analysis considers 
the strength of the evidence as to the 
commission of the other crime, the 
similarities between the crimes, the interval 
of time that has elapsed between the crimes, 
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the need for the evidence, the efficacy of 
alternative proof, and the degree to which 
the evidence probably will arouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. 
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988). 
The probative value of understanding the relationship 
between defendant and Jody Carpenter was significant to the 
jury's understanding of defendant's intent, preparation, and plan 
to conspire with Jared Mendoza to kill Timothy Lords. Without 
such background, the jury would be subject to precisely the 
"undue confusion'' that rule 403 seeks to avoid. That is, knowing 
that defendant took over Carpenter's drug business, that Mendoza 
owed Carpenter — and then defendant — a substantial amount of 
money for drugs used but not paid for, and that defendant had 
retaliated against others who also owed drug money, all addressed 
the crucial issue of why Mendoza and defendant would conspire to 
kill Lords. Because these facts were integral to the story of 
the conspiracy and, indeed, all occurred within a short time 
frame, the need for the evidence was especially great. See State 
v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988). Finally, 
defendant has failed to demonstrate that evidence of his 
involvement in the drug trade would have "roused the jury to 
overmastering hostility" and caused them to incorrectly convict 
him. Indeed, the jury acquitted defendant of the most serious 
charge in this case. For all of these reasons, the danger of 
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unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probativeness 
of the evidence to which defendant objects. 
Defendant also objects for the first time on appeal to 
testimony from a police officer that defendant admitted to using 
meth both in Ogden and over the next few days before his arrest, 
and to testimony from Jared Mendoza that defendant gave him an 
intimidating, dirty look that Mendoza characterized as "[j]ust a 
prison look. Everybody that's been in prison has the same look." 
See Br. of Aplt. at 23 (citing R. 185: 136; R. 186: 12).8 In 
order to prevail under the rubrics of both plain error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must ultimately 
establish prejudice or harm, to the extent that the reviewing 
court's confidence in the verdict is undermined. State v. Verde, 
770 P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989). 
Here, it can hardly be said that the statements undermined 
confidence in the jury's verdict. At its core, this case was 
about a drug-related murder. Indeed, defendant, Mendoza, and 
Lords all found themselves in the same vehicle driving to Ogden 
precisely because — in defendant's words — "There's no dope in 
town. You know, everybody wants dope" (R. 186: 45-46). All 
three men were deeply involved in the drug trade, as buyers, 
8
 Arguably, the prison remark could also go to the reason 
Mendoza feared defendant and was willing to kill for him, as 
another instance of defendant's intimidation. Because it is a 
closer call, however, the state chooses to analyze the remark 
under a prejudice analysis. 
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sellers, and users. The motivation for the murder, to retaliate 
on an alleged snitch, was also drug-related. See R. 185: 111, 
123, 129. It is unlikely to have come as any surprise to the 
jury to learn either that defendant used drugs around the time 
Lords was murdered or that he had at some point served time in 
prison.9 These passing comments simply paled in comparison to 
the chilling circumstances of the murder itself. Having failed 
to demonstrate anything more than a speculative possibility of a 
more favorable outcome in the absence of these comments, 
defendant's claims of plain error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel fail. Any error in the admission of the evidence was 
harmless. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d at 124 n.15. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count of conspiracy to commit murder, a second 
degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this lp' day of September, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
9
 Moreover, for strategic reasons, defense counsel may have 
chosen not to object, in order to avoid unduly emphasizing the 
prison reference to the jury. 
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